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CITIZENSHIP VERSUS PATRIOTISM IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENGLAND*
JUL I A STAPLETON
University of Durham
A B S T R ACT. This article explores some of the tensions and interaction between two rival conceptions of
the relationship between citizenship and patriotism in twentieth-century England. The ﬁrst was widespread
among the intellectual elite and greatly qualiﬁed the role of patriotism in sustaining a higher ideal of
citizenship. The second was generally the preserve of popular writers and activists who conceived citizenship
in terms of patriotic attachment to the English and English-British nation. However, the article maintains
that the Edwardian intellectual elite often assumed an homogeneous national culture as the basis of suc-
cessful citizenship, both local and international. In this regard, despite subjection to increasing strain,
continuity as much as change is apparent in conceptions of citizenship up to and including the interventions of
Enoch Powell in the debate over mass immigration. Subsequent attempts to ground citizenship in diﬀerence
rather than sameness have greatly intensiﬁed the tension with a more persistent culture of patriotism.
In a recent study Krishan Kumar has argued convincingly that a shared national
identity in England is little more than a century old. Against a growing trend of
medievalists to locate the origins of Englishness as far back as the age of Bede,
and early modernists to favour the sixteenth century in this regard, Kumar
emphasizes the ‘moment ’ of English nationhood as the turn of the nineteenth
century and the erosion of British industrial and imperial supremacy. Previously,
English national awareness had been weak due to a range of competing loyalties –
supra-national and sub-national ; England’s ascendancy within the wider British
nation also served to suppress its development. Even when national consciousness
ﬂowered in England in the late nineteenth century its expression was typically
cultural, in the longer term remaining distinct from the more political varieties of
continental nationalism to which – for a short while – it bore some resemblance.1
However, Kumar’s analysis considerably underplays widespread ambivalence
among the intellectual elite towards the enhanced self-consciousness of the
English nation at the end of the nineteenth century, unlike the active encour-
agement which many of its counterparts in continental Europe gave to similar
* I am extremely grateful to the following for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft : Stefan
Collini, Peter Mandler, Peter P. Nicholson, Stamatoula Panagakou, two anonymous referees, and the
Politics Department at the University of Sheﬃeld, at whose research seminar I gave a paper based on
this article.
1 K. Kumar, The making of English national identity (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 200, 202, 233.
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developments there. This arose from a concern that the ideal of citizenship
associated with the development of democracy should not be debased by an
unreﬂective patriotism hitched to a strong sense of nationhood. Two distinct but
interrelated cultures can be seen to have emerged from this clash : one centred on
citizenship, the other on patriotism.
The concept of citizenship promoted by an academic community of philo-
sophers, classicists, social scientists, and political thinkers was rooted in an attach-
ment to the state as the supreme focus of collective loyalty, identity, and the
common good. They were generally wary of the emotive language of nationhood,
emphasizing instead the importance of democratic, liberal, and civic values based
on reason. They by no means excluded the possibility that the will of society
presently embodied in states would expand to form the basis of a sovereign
international community, a development to be warmly welcomed.2 Indeed,
advocates of citizenship often assumed a level of cohesion and patriotic charge akin
to that of their own society as a precondition of widening social sentiment, while
at the same time seeking to sublimate its ‘national ’ character. Although the
citizenship ideal was cultivated primarily in academic circles, it was successfully
projected well beyond. For example, the Idealist philosophers Bernard Bosanquet
and J. S. Mackenzie spread what was in eﬀect a gospel of citizenship in the
Charity Organization Society and the Civic Education League respectively ; they
also published with non-academic publishers and in non-specialist journals.3
At the same time but in other quarters, vigorous attempts were made to deﬁne
the citizen in terms of the English patriot. This ideal was championed by writers
and activists who served broad public audiences. These audiences undoubtedly
overlapped with those to whom the ethic of citizenship was addressed. However,
quite plausibly, the audience for patriotism held up as that of its rival contracted
as the pace of academic specialization and professionalization accelerated.
The ideal of patriotism emphasized the primacy of the nation over the state
and the impossibility, indeed incoherence, of a world in which national ties had
been signiﬁcantly loosened.4 The support of avowed patriots for their state was
not always guaranteed, especially when it threatened to subjugate other peoples,
2 For example, for Idealist thinkers in this vein, see D. Boucher, ‘British Idealism, the state, and
international relations’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (1994), pp. 671–94.
3 On Bosanquet and the Charity Organization Society, see S. Collini, ‘Hobhouse, Bosanquet and
the state : philosophical idealism and political argument in England, 1880–1918’, Past and Present, 72
(1976), pp. 86–111. On Mackenzie and the Civic Education League, see his oﬀer to write a book on
citizenship for the Home University Library at the request of the League in letters to Gilbert Murray,
17 Dec. 1919 and 15 Jan. 1924, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MSS Murray, 406/167 and 407/1. On the
Civic Education League, an organization which became an arm of Le Play House and the Institute of
Sociology, see D. F. T. Evans, ‘Le Play House and the regional survey movement in British sociology,
1920–1955’ (M.Phil. thesis, City of Birmingham Polytechnic, 1986).
4 G. K. Chesterton asked the cosmopolitan ‘who professes to love humanity and hate local
preference …: ‘‘How can you love humanity and hate anything so human?’’ ’ : ‘The patriotic idea’, in
L. Oldershaw, ed., England: a nation : being the papers of the Patriots’ Club (London, 1904), p. 10. On the
background of this non-existent club, see M. Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (London, 1944), p. 248.
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for example, the Irish and the Boers.5 In this way English patriotism in the
twentieth century was more than simply – in the words of Jonathan Clark – a
‘decorous, libertarian, non-aggressive ’ substitute for nationalism, narrowly
centred on political culture and institutions ; it was often rooted in a conception of
the English people as a distinct spiritual or cultural whole.6 As J. H. Grainger has
written of the diverse patriotisms of Edwardian England, ‘Kings, Lords and
Commons and Church articulated and represented the continuities, remained
deeply expressive of ancient cohesion but did not set the patria in motion’.7 This is
clear in the founding of the Royal Society of St George in 1894 by Howard Ruﬀ,
to ‘ strengthen…and maintain…that spirit of nationality and sentiment of race
which should associate all of kindred blood wherever dispersed’.8 For the
Society – as for later ﬁgures such as George Orwell (brieﬂy) and Enoch
Powell – citizenship and patriotism were two, co-equal sides of a larger national
coin. Patriotic identiﬁcation with English nationhood at this thin end of a thick
nationalist wedge – the concept of the English ‘race ’ was not inherently racist and
a seed-ground of intolerance9 – merits close examination ; it does so particularly
in relation to the ideals of collective national life pursued by academic thinkers.
While the alignment of patriotism and English nationhood may not have led to a
5 H. Law, ‘The Case of Ireland’, in Oldershaw, ed., England, pp. 130–58; on the sympathy of
patriots such as Chesterton and – earlier – James Froude for the Boers, see S. Weaver, ‘The pro-
Boers: war, empire, and the uses of nostalgia in turn-of-the-century England’, in G. K. Behlmer and
F. M. Levanthal, eds., Singular continuities : tradition, nostalgia, and identity in modern British culture (Stanford,
CA, 2000), pp. 43–57.
6 J. C. D. Clark, Our shadowed present : modernism, postmodernism and history (London, 2003), pp. 61–2, 88,
96. Clark both underestimates the strength of patriotism in England, Britain, and the United Kingdom
and its basis in nationality. He claims that certain ‘group’ identities prevailed over the nation in all
three contexts, rooted in ‘allegiance, shared history, liberty, law, superior civilization and the polity’s
place within a scenario of the historical development of Christendom’: p. 93. This is undeniable but
such bonds were arguably constitutive of, rather than alternatives to, the various senses of nationhood
here.
7 J. H. Grainger, Patriotisms : Britain, 1900–1940 (London, 1986), p. 64. I draw upon but seek to
extend this ﬁne book in the present article.
8 Letter to the editor, signed by Alfred Bower, lord mayor, and nine other oﬃcers of the Society,
The English Race, Journal of the Royal Society of St George, 38 (Aug. 1926), p. 6. In the early 1880s,
dismayed by the lack of English national consciousness and also ignorance of the role which England
had played in the building of empire, Ruﬀ initiated the practice of wearing a rose on St George’s Day.
He gave up farming and rural pursuits to devote himself full time to the cause of English patriotism,
leaving the whole of his residuary estate on the death of his wife to Trustees for the Society he had
founded: see his obituary, The English Race, 47 (Mar. 1929), pp. 8–9. The Society is overlooked by
Kumar, Clark, and even Grainger.
9 For opposing views, see for example, T. Kusher and K. Lunn, Traditions of intolerance : historical
perspectives on fascism and race discourse in Britain (Manchester, 1989). Anti-Semitism, in particular, was
certainly present in political thought, even on the Left : see, for example, V. Geoghegan, ‘Edward
Carpenter’s England revisited’, History of Political Thought, 24 (2003), pp. 509–27. But evidence of the
exclusivity of English self-projection in political thought and action is not uniform: an ardent patriot
who vociferously opposed anti-alien hysteria in Edwardian Britain is Winston Churchill. His campaign
against the Aliens Bill in 1904 won him the support of Nathan Laski – father of Harold Laski – and the
seat of North-West Manchester for the Liberal party: see I. Kramnick and B. Sheerman, Harold Laski :
a life on the Left (London, 1993), pp. 20–5.
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separate political party, arguably it more than matched the citizenship culture in
deﬁning England – and Britain10 – as national communities, and shaping opinion
on a wide range of issues for much of the twentieth century and beyond.
This article charts some of the tensions and interaction between these two
cultures of citizenship and patriotism since around 1900, and emphasizes the
weight of their historical legacy. Neither was particularly exercised by the sig-
niﬁcant race, class, and gender inequalities that compromised the legal deﬁnition
of nationality and citizenship, especially in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century ;
however, this was potentially more serious for the citizenship paradigm, depen-
dent as it was upon the possession and exercise of actual political rights for the
expression of communal identity and will. It is also important to emphasize at the
outset that both cultures were informed to varying degrees by a broad-based
liberalism that cut across the boundaries of conservatism and socialism; con-
sequently, polarization of the two cultures on Left–Right lines has been limited.
The wider lines of division ran instead along an internationalist–nationalist axis
that was by no means mutually exclusive, however weak at times the commitment
to one side may have become on the part of those who prioritized the other. The
article maintains that the two cultures remained relatively stable at a conceptual
level until the late twentieth century when attempts to renew the culture of
citizenship cast oﬀ much of the simultaneous concern with ethical, class, and
(implicitly) national homogeneity that had sustained earlier citizenship discourse.
In this context, conﬂict with a more persistent ideal of patriotism intensiﬁed; at
the same time, the audiences of the two cultures ﬁnally broke apart.
I
Intellectuals in Britain had not always been hostile to the cause of the nation.
Liberal nationalism with respect to oppressed nations abroad had been widely
embraced by the mid- to late Victorian intelligentsia. As Peter Mandler has
argued, while large parts of an essentially liberal elite had recoiled in horror from
the 1848 revolutions in Europe, by the 1860s an equally signiﬁcant number had
warmed to the democratic principles, especially, on which the claims of the
nation to determine its own destiny seemed to be founded.11 One notable voice of
dissent – Lord Acton – approached nationalism from the combined perspectives
of continental politics and Roman Catholicism. Signiﬁcantly, he distrusted
10 For the view that English traits often became synonymous with Britishness after 1900, especially
as the Protestantism on which British identity had traded heavily in previous centuries diminished in
force, see J. K. Walton, ‘Britishness’, in C. Wrigley, ed., A companion to early twentieth-century Britain
(Oxford, 2002), pp. 520, 529.
11 P. Mandler, ‘ ‘‘Race’’ and ‘‘Nation’’ in mid-Victorian thought’, in S. Collini, R. Whatmore, and
B. Young, eds., History, religion and culture : British intellectual history, 1750–1950 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 230;
and idem, ‘The consciousness of modernity? Liberalism and the English ‘‘national character’’,
1870–1940’, in B. Rieger and M. Daunton, eds., Meanings of modernity : Britain from the late-Victorian era to
World War II (Oxford, 2001), pp. 119–44.
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nationalism for the same reason that his contemporaries endorsed it : an inextri-
cable association with the popular will.12 Liberal nationalism was further
nourished by the communitarian temper of liberal radicalism during the second
half of the nineteenth century ; this was expressed in the later writings of John
Stuart Mill and was central to nationalist debate in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales
towards the end of the nineteenth century.13
However, even in this period of relative goodwill towards the nation, the in-
tellectual elite rarely encouraged a sense of British, much less English, nation-
hood; their concern was limited to explaining change in terms of national
characteristics and the essentially modern forces which had shaped them,
culminating in democracy.14 The great apostle of empire as the focus of English
national identity in the late Victorian period, J. R. Seeley, well illustrates this
wider indiﬀerence. For Seeley, ‘England’ was virtually meaningless outside of the
imperial state to which it had been harnessed; in this sense the pre-history of
England was far older than its history proper, and of little bearing.15 The strongest
invocation of English national character and identity as source rather than
consequence of empire came from J. F. Stephen. This was in reaction against the
resurgence of Catholicism in the latter half of the nineteenth century on the one
hand, and the perceived cosmopolitanism of popular liberals such as Richard
Cobden and John Bright on the other.16 But Stephen’s ideas found little response
among his contemporaries. More typical of the attitude of the intelligentsia
towards English nationhood was the view of his fellow lawyer, A. V. Dicey, that
the English people could take most pride in the absence of national pride,
particularly among their politicians and political intellectuals, if not poets and
writers ; such signal lack of nationalist feeling was, at the very least, the source
of unparalleled freedom.17 While this essentially inverted form of nationalism
could be accompanied by a close identity with the Anglo-Saxon race, the
latter was frequently interpreted in terms of a widely dispersed people with
common ties and aﬀections rather than biological race or nationhood more
narrowly.18 For Dicey, the Anglo-Saxon race provided the basis on which bridges
of ‘common citizenship’ could be built across geographical and constitutional
divides. He emphasized the value of binding England closer to her former
American colonies on the basis of ‘common legal conceptions ’ and associated
12 See T. Lang, ‘Lord Acton and the insanity of nationalism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 63 (2003),
pp. 129–49.
13 See E. F. Biagini, Citizenship and community : liberals, radicals and collective identities in the British Isles,
1865–1931 (Cambridge, 1996). 14 Mandler, ‘The consciousness of modernity?’, p. 121.
15 R. N. Soﬀer, ‘History and religion: J. R. Seeley and the burden of the past ’, in R. W. Davis and
R. J. Helmstadter, eds., Religion and irreligion in Victorian society : essays in honour of R. K. Webb (London,
1992), p. 142.
16 See J. Stapleton, ‘James Fitzjames Stephen: liberalism, patriotism, and English liberty ’, Victorian
Studies, 41 (1998), pp. 243–65.
17 See A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the nineteenth
century (1905; London, 1940), p. 463. 18 Kumar, The making of English national identity, pp. 206–7.
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beliefs and sentiments, not least strong aversion to the continental practice of
conscription.19
By the turn of the century, the prior claims of citizenship over those of
nationhood and patriotism struck the dominant note of liberal intellectual culture
in Britain. Partly this was due to disquiet about the illiberal, racist turn of
European nationalist movements.20 The British empire was also instrumental in
heightening suspicion of the nation in such circles. Following reports of unseemly
behaviour by the crowds on Mafeking night, the young J. M. Keynes identiﬁed a
cult of ‘patrophobia ’ in intellectual life, as strong – and even to his Liberal
mind – as distasteful as that of ‘ jingoism’ beyond.21 For progressive liberals such
as L. T. Hobhouse, imperialism had corrupted patriotism by transforming legit-
imate pride in national independence into chauvinism and aggrandisement. At
the same time the imperialist spirit of the triumphant nation threatened to subvert
the movement of democratic citizenship at home, dependent as empire was on
authoritative government abroad.22 According to Hobhouse, liberalism some-
times had to take risks with nationalism and recognize the claim of subject
peoples, like the Irish, to full political rights ; their case was unanswerable, unlike
that of the sectarian Protestant minority in the north.23 But whenever liberalism
acted thus, it did so with a heavy heart.
It was left to the popular patriotic leagues of Edwardian England – for
example, the Navy League, the Tariﬀ Reform League, and the Victoria
League – loudly to extol England’s achievements and the virtue of national
loyalty, particularly in the context of empire.24 While liberal intellectual ﬁgure-
heads of the Leagues were not unknown – for example, Spencer Wilkinson,
co-founder of the Navy League25 – their closest, albeit unacknowledged, ally was
the Left. Since the 1880s, despite internal opposition, the Left had sought to
regain the sense of common English and English-British nationhood that had
19 A. V. Dicey, ‘A common citizenship for the English race’, Contemporary Review, 71 (1897),
pp. 457–76, at pp. 465, 469. Paul Rich has wrongly characterized Dicey’s conception of Anglo-Saxon
unity in terms of ‘blood’ in Race and empire in British politics (Cambridge, 1986), p. 13.
20 On the increasing pessimism of Bryce and Dicey – two followers of Mazzini in the 1860s –
towards nationalism following the upsurge of ‘ racial feeling’ within, see Rich, Race and empire in British
politics, pp. 23–4; on their political disillusion more widely, see C. Harvie, The lights of liberalism: university
liberals and the challenge of democracy, 1860–1885 (London, 1976).
21 R. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, I : Hopes betrayed, 1883–1920 (London, 1983), p. 91 ; see also
Gilbert Murray’s reaction to Mafeking night in ‘National ideals : conscious and unconscious’ (1900),
reprinted in Essays and addresses (London, 1921).
22 L. T. Hobhouse, Democracy and reaction (London, 1904), p. 17; ‘The principle of citizenship’, from
Morals in evolution (London, 1906), reprinted in J. Meadowcroft, ed., L. T. Hobhouse : Liberalism and other
writings (Cambridge, 1994), p. 148.
23 Hobhouse, ‘ Irish nationalism and liberal principle’ (1912), in Meadowcroft, ed., L. T. Hobhouse,
p. 168.
24 See F. Coetzee, For party or country : nationalism and the dilemmas of popular conservatism in Edwardian
England (New York, 1990) ; also E. Riedi, ‘Women, gender, and the promotion of empire: the Victoria
League, 1901–1914’, Historical Journal, 45 (2002), pp. 569–99.
25 (Henry) Spencer Wilkinson became Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford in 1909. He
co-authored a book with Charles Dilke entitled National defence (London, 1892).
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been lost with industrial capitalism, if necessary through support for imperial
expansion.26 Indeed, one force behind the upsurge of patriotism in the early years
of the twentieth century was a belief that a major casualty of industrialization and
urbanization had been the spontaneous attachment of ordinary people to their
nation generated by idyllic, rural habitations.27
Stephen Heathorn has recently argued that the failure of British socialism to
shed the language of the nation before the First World War was a direct result of
the teaching of ‘national ’ literacy through basic literacy in elementary schools
with the advent of popular democracy. It is evident from his meticulous research
into English language textbooks that patriotic values and ideals of nationhood
were certainly boosted by the teaching profession in this way. But nationalist
sensibilities were ﬁltered primarily through the ‘prism’ of citizenship, and with
the interests of the state in ‘rational ’ loyalty and obedience from a population
still largely denied political rights kept ﬁrmly in view. In other words, nationhood
was promoted in schools as a surrogate for full citizen status. Furthermore, as
Heathorn makes clear, unease about too overtly nationalist an agenda was not
unknown in educational circles, over and above a concern to avoid the propa-
gandist and partisan aims of the patriotic Leagues.28 Finally, such provision as
there was for nationalist education in Britain signally failed to satisfy the patriotic
die-hards – for example, Arthur Boutwood, Lord Roberts, Lord Milner, and
Lord Baden-Powell – who looked enviously at Germany, the United States, and
Japan.29 These ﬁgures invested their hopes instead in youth organizations such as
the Boy Scouts movement which were not hindered by the reluctance of public
authorities to address the needs of the patria head-on.
Against this backdrop, the ideal of the rational citizen – both virtual and
actual – clashed heavily with the engaged patriot as competing embodiments of
political virtue before 1914. An alternative model of the engaged citizen in conﬂict
rather than harmony with the state was developed by militant suﬀragettes and
other disempowered groups who attacked the exclusivity of citizenship in the
dominant liberal understandings of the term. But the overall fault lines between
rational citizenship and patriotic attachment to the community of the nation
remained intact.30 Of course, as we shall see, citizenship culture was never
26 P. Ward, Red ﬂag and Union Jack : Englishness, patriotism and the British Left, 1881–1924 (Woodbridge,
1990).
27 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 39. This was a key theme of Arthur Bryant, who, as will be seen,
attempted to sustain the momentum of Edwardian patriotism after the First World War. See, for
example, his weekly column, ‘Our notebook’ (which he inherited from Chesterton in 1936) in the
Illustrated London News (hereafter ILN ), 13 Dec. 1947, p. 650.
28 S. Heathorn, For home, country, and race : constructing gender, class, and Englishness in the elementary school,
1880–1914 (Toronto, 2000), pp. 20–1, 34, 207–9.
29 Grainger, Patriotisms, pp. 27–42; see also G. K. Chesterton, ‘A defence of patriotism’, in The
Defendant (London, 1901). On Boutwood, see n. 38 below.
30 On this alternative model of the citizen in the women’s suﬀrage movement – not least its basis in
reason – see L. E. Nym Mayhall, The militant suﬀrage movement : citizenship and resistance in Britain,
1860–1930 (New York, 2003), pp. 7–8.
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completely dissociated from the empire which stirred large parts of the patriotic
imagination of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, nor from its English and
British national core. At the same time a progressive liberal such as J. A. Hobson
could be cautiously receptive to the emotional life of crowds which underpinned
patriotism and other ends transcending the self ; this he saw as a necessary
corrective to the abstractions of elite political theory.31 Nevertheless, the domi-
nant liberal ideals of citizenship, at least, were distinctive for being articulated
primarily in moral rather than overtly national and even legal terms. The tone was
well struck by James Bryce in his Yale Lectures on ‘the responsibilities of
citizenship ’ in 1909. Bryce emphasized the shortcomings of contemporary
mankind with regard to civic duty, for which he believed a blind patriotism was
partly to blame. Admonishing the people of both Britain and America for not
‘caring enough for [their] country ’, he declared :
It is easy to wave a ﬂag, to cheer an eminent statesman, to exult in some achievement by
land or sea. But our imaginations are too dull to realize either the grandeur of the State in
its splendid opportunities for promoting the welfare of the masses, or the fact that the
nobility of the State lies in its being the true child, the true exponent, of the enlightened will
of a right-minded and law-abiding people.32
As Roberto Romani has emphasized, citizenship for Bryce was essentially a
discipline for the lack of rational collective direction consequent upon
democracy.33
I I
The concern to channel patriotic sentiment and duty into citizenship and away
from nationhood was greatly enhanced by the neo-Idealist revival in Britain.34
Led by T. H. Green, an Oxford contemporary of Dicey and Bryce before his
early death in 1882, Idealism provided a powerful philosophical foundation for
the spirit of altruism, self-sacriﬁce, and obligation which seized the governing
and intellectual classes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this
context, the hopes for the future of society held by Idealist thinkers such as
Sir Henry Jones were crystallized in the concept of citizenship as a dissolvent
of class diﬀerences and the basis of self-realization within a wider social
31 G. Gerson, ‘Liberalism, welfare and the crowd in J. A. Hobson’, History of European Ideas, 30
(2004), pp. 197–215. 32 J. Bryce, The hindrances to good citizenship (New Haven, CT, 1909), p. 41.
33 R. Romani, National character and public spirit in Britain and France, 1750–1914 (Cambridge, 2002),
pp. 325–6.
34 J. R. Gibbons has written that ‘ the citizenship aspect of idealism, which placed priority upon the
voluntary participation at a possible plurality of levels in the organization of the state, excludes all but
the weakest forms of nationalism’. He emphasizes the contrast with the ‘exclusive’ nationalist path
which Idealism took in other countries, for example in Germany through Fichte and in Italy through
Gentile : see ‘Liberalism, nationalism, and the English Idealists ’, History of European Ideas, 15 (1992),
pp. 491–7, at pp. 493, 496.
158 J U L I A S T A P L E TON
whole.35 Idealism was also an attempt to rescue Christian morality from the
damaging inﬂuence of biblical scholarship which had recently brought the his-
torical veracity of the gospels into question. Green thus turned to Aristotle’s Ethics
as the mainspring of the philosophy of human brotherhood centred on the state to
which Christianity had merely given a new zeal and more extensive application.36
Green was certainly not impervious to patriotism as a vehicle of his moral and
political ends. In his Lectures on the principles of political obligation (1879–80) he praised
the spirit of patriotism – with its roots in ‘common ways of feeling and think-
ing ’ – as an exemplar of the will for the common good which he believed was the
source of all human perfection.37 For Green the ‘ intelligent patriot ’ was the key
source of the moral life of society conceived in Kantian, universalistic terms; the
intelligent patriot is the conscientious citizen of the posthumously published
Prolegomena to ethics (1883), whose moral strivings keep a society’s ethical ideals alive
and growing.
Yet Green kept the ends of the state strictly in perspective : its purpose was not
to enhance national power or cultural identity but to ensure the spiritual and
material well-being of its citizens.38 He was once purported to have said that ‘he
would rather see the ﬂag of England trailed in the dirt than add sixpence to the
taxes that weigh upon the poor ’.39 It was a conception of ‘ true ’ patriotism that he
reiterated before packed public meetings of Liberal Associations in and around
Oxford in the late 1870s at the height of Disraeli’s foreign campaigns.40
Furthermore, ‘ true’ patriotism required continuing democratic reform in the
35 On the contrast between Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall – a mid-twentieth-century sociologist
who also emphasized the potential of citizenship to transcend the divisions of social class – see E. Low,
‘Class and the conceptualization of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain’, History of Political Thought,
21 (2000), pp. 114–31. Marshall is considered brieﬂy later in this article.
36 F. M. Turner, The Greek heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven, CT, 1981), pp. 358–65.
37 T. H. Green, Lectures on the principles of political obligation (1886; London, 1931), pp. 130–1.
38 Contrast Green’s suspicion of nationhood, particularly when turned outwards, with the response
of perhaps his only Conservative disciple, Arthur Boutwood, a civil servant. Writing against the
backdrop of the South African war, Boutwood championed the virtues of patriotism and national
sentiment as integral to good citizenship; citizens should not denounce their country before its
enemies, even on the few occasions when ‘national policy’ was mistaken. Boutwood denied that (British)
national policy was ever immoral : see H. Egerton (Boutwood’s pen-name), Patriotism: an essay towards a
constructive theory of politics (London, 1905), pp. 291–2. On Boutwood, see E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of
conservatism: conservative political ideas in the twentieth century (Oxford, 2001), ch. 2.
39 James Bryce, Studies in contemporary biography (London, 1903), pp. 97–8.
40 See Green’s speeches of 1878 and 1879 in Peter P. Nicholson, ed., The collected works of T. H. Green
(5 vols., Bristol, 1997), V : Miscellaneous writings, speeches and letters, pp. 262–3, 267–8, 313–15, and 352, see
also in the same volume Green’s interesting undergraduate essay, ‘The principle of honour; its history
and value in ancient and modern times’, pp. 6–8. This piece discusses the decline of the collective
sense of national honour in large, heterogeneous states, resurfacing only in times of war. It was a
positive development as far as Green was concerned. Crucial to the process was the establishment of
the higher laws of ‘ justice’ and equality of personal rights. In other words common citizenship has
supplanted exclusive ‘common feeling’ and lack of any ‘regard for man as such’ upon which – Green
believed – national honour thrives to the detriment of society.
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interests of ‘ full ’ citizenship, a view which Green maintained even after the defeat
of the Liberal party in 1874 on an extended suﬀrage.41
The spirit of Green’s views on citizenship and patriotism was reiterated by his
disciple, Bernard Bosanquet, for all his greater optimism about social relations in
Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century. Society, Bosanquet maintained, in
his Philosophical theory of the state in 1899, was increasingly constituted by an ‘organic
unity ’ of experience across its diverse parts through internalization of a common
good expressed in the General Will. Citizenship was thus rooted in sameness, the
integration of diﬀerences and their ‘completion’ at a higher level in the state.42
Bosanquet did not rule out dissent and even disobedience in the attainment of this
end, within the limits, that is, of broad acceptance of the state and its beneﬁts
which clearly distinguished his conception of citizenship from that of the suﬀra-
gettes and other radicals. Like Green, he assumed a symbiosis between citizenship
and democratic inclusion in the widest sense.43 However, this left little scope for
the cultivation of nationhood per se, even pending the universal status of citi-
zenship, as in elementary schools. Bosanquet could consistently support the
League of Nations since in his view nations were simply ‘ sovereign communities ’
with common moral features as well as their own particularity.44 Patriotism was
the handmaid of this unifying concept of citizenship, not a vehicle of national
identity, military dominance, or opposition to the state ; it enjoined a simple ethic
of ‘daily sober loyalty ’ to one’s fellow citizens, inspired by ‘ love for our country as
an instrument and embodiment of truth, beauty, and kindness, or, in the largest
and profoundest sense of the word, religion’. For Bosanquet, Plato demonstrated
conclusively the sense of country as ‘citizen-loyalty ’ in Socrates’s refusal to evade
the sentence of law passed on him at his trial.45
The relationship between citizenship, patriotism, nationality, and religion in
British Idealist thought was thus complex and often diﬃcult ; moreover, it varied
across several generations of adherents. A third-generation Idealist, the classicist,
historian, and political scientist, Ernest Barker, was too late a Victorian to ex-
perience the crisis of faith that troubled Green and others of his generation.46
41 C. Tyler, ‘T. H. Green, advanced liberalism and the reform question, 1865–1876’, History of
European Ideas, 29 (2003), pp. 437–58.
42 B. Bosanquet, The philosophical theory of the state (1899; London, 1920), pp. 270, lix.
43 The importance of democracy to Bosanquet’s theory of the General Will – often denied by his
critics – and his acceptance of dissent but within a wider context of appreciation of the state has been
well emphasized by Peter P. Nicholson, The political philosophy of the British Idealists (Cambridge, 1990),
pp. 211–21.
44 Bosanquet, The philosophical theory of the state, p. 307; he referred to nations as ‘ sovereign com-
munities ’ in his essay ‘The function of the state in promoting the unity of mankind’, in Social and
international ideals : being studies in patriotism (London, 1917), p. 296.
45 Idem., ‘The teaching of patriotism’ (1911), in Social and international ideals, p. 5, see also his
‘Patriotism in the perfect state ’, in E. M. Sidgwick, ed., The international crisis in its ethical and psychological
signiﬁcance (London, 1915), pp. 132–54.
46 I have expanded on this in ‘Third generation idealism: religion and nationality in the political
thought of Ernest Barker’, in T. Battin, ed., A passion for politics : essays in honour of Graham Maddox
(Melbourne, forthcoming).
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Accordingly, he played up the sui generis role of Christianity in forging the ties of
citizenship at a higher level than had been achieved in antiquity. It did so not least
through the auspices of the nation after the collapse of the Roman empire and
the tribal society which succeeded it. For Barker, nationhood provided the basis
of the civic ideal in its modern form by ‘enrich[ing] and dignify[ing] human
personality ’ ; while on the face of it negating the universalist ambitions of
Christianity, the early European nation was, nevertheless, ‘ in eodem genere ’ on
account of its essentially spiritual, rather than biological nature.47
However, for Barker, nations were created by states, not vice versa ; as he
explained in his Stevenson Lectures on Citizenship at Glasgow in 1925, they were
products of the ‘accumulation of tradition ’ in which states necessarily engaged in
establishing the unity of their domain.48 Fashioned by ‘nurture ’ rather than
‘nature ’49 and imbued with Christian precepts, nationality had proved a force for
unity and ﬂuidity among mankind, and the equality of peoples. Nation-building
had hence become the ‘mission’ of later imperial states, providing the most
eﬀective basis of self-government in the face of overwhelming religious and
linguistic diﬀerences, as in the case of India.50 Earlier in his career he had stated
that the nation in this mould underlay the character of British citizenship as
‘ subjecthood’, or ‘ indelible ’ allegiance to the sovereign, not narrow racial, tribal,
or – when pushed too far – civic identity.51 Modern citizenship conceived thus
was characteristically superﬁcial, but by that very fact, extensive in scope; by
contrast, the ancient model exacted a high price of exclusivity for the intimate
civic bonds it forged. The high price of the British empire’s ‘ inclusiveness ’ in
terms of the negation of the subjecthood and hence citizenship of women upon
marriage to an alien in the interests of imperial unity and their ineligibility for
naturalization seemed unworthy of comment.52
47 E. Barker, ‘Christianity and nationality’ (1927), in Church, state and study (London, 1930), pp. 135,
137, 143.
48 E. Barker, National character : and the factors in its formation (1928; London, 1927), pp. 15–16.
49 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
50 E. Barker, ‘The contact of colours and civilisations ’, Contemporary Review (Nov. 1930), pp. 578–87,
at p. 585. On the optimism of the British Idealists more generally towards the British empire, and their
‘ethical or sentimental ’ conception of it, see Boucher, ‘British Idealism, the state, and international
relations’, p. 682.
51 E. Barker, The political thought of Plato and Aristotle (London, 1906), pp. 299–300. The Naturalization
Act of 1870 modiﬁed the notion of ‘ indelible ’ allegiance by recognizing the naturalization of British
subjects elsewhere; but it left unaltered the principle of allegiance as the basis of citizenship. In 1914, it
was given statutory deﬁnition in the ‘common code’ enshrined in the British Nationality and Status of
Aliens Act, thereby binding together the empire in the face of the common enemy, see A. Dummett
and A. Nichol, Subjects, citizens, aliens and others : nationality and immigration law (London, 1990) pp. 88,
124–5.
52 Barker mentioned the Naturalization Act of 1870 as modifying the principle of allegiance estab-
lished in Calvin’s case (1608) but failed to acknowledge its considerable loosening of the principle in the
case of married women: Political thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 299 n. 2. On this provision of the
Act – which was reinforced in the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act – and the protest of
feminist organizations in the empire during the interwar period, see M. Page Baldwin, ‘Subject to
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For all their diﬀerences Idealist thinkers were united in a concern to detach
citizenship from the idea of the nation as a discrete and ineluctable unit of society.
In the ﬁrst four decades of the twentieth century R. B. Haldane embraced a
‘Sittlichkeit ’ of Britain, Canada, and the United States ; Barker a Federal Order
of Europe; and, as we have seen, Bosanquet supported the League of Nations.53
This is despite assuming a relatively homogeneous and stable national culture and
character as the basis of civic life, broadly conceived.54 Moreover, they discussed
nationhood in terms of national ‘minds ’ (not ‘ souls ’), which eschewed the
providential and romantic conceptions of England often found in contemporary
patriotic discourse. When Bosanquet declared that ‘ there is not, and never has
been, a national mind more highly endowed than the English ’, he supported his
assertion with the example of ‘ the great organized institutions which have sprung
unaided from the brain of our wage-earning class ’.55 Bosanquet’s resolutely intel-
lectualist perspective on nationhood and patriotism would have failed to satisfy
more passionate champions of these ideals as rooted in instinctive and particu-
larist rather than rational and (potentially, at least) universal ties.56 Such
advocates were constantly on their guard against attempts to weaken the sense of
identity and belonging which in their view was generated uniquely by nations in
general and England in particular.
I I I
The distance between the rational ideal of citizenship advocated by Bryce,
Bosanquet, and others, and the emotionally engaged ideals of patriotism and the
nation which it sought to undermine can be gauged by the reﬂections on English
life of their near-contemporary, G. K. Chesterton. In his book, Heretics (1905),
Chesterton tore a strip oﬀ the literary giants of the late Victorian and Edwardian
period – Shaw, Wells, Wilde, Moore, and Kipling – for dismissing not just
Christian orthodoxy but orthodoxy tout court. Their immersion in the ‘details ’ of
human life to the neglect of the wider cosmic processes which alone made those
details intelligible typiﬁed for Chesterton the grip of agnosticism on the minds of
the literary elite. Equally worrying was their indiﬀerence to those local and small-
scale attachments which attained fullest expression in the nation; the nation was
the epicentre of ordinary lives and was crucial to the imagining of universals,
empire: married women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act ’, Journal of British Studies,
40 (2001), pp. 522–56.
53 E. Barker, ‘The problem of an order of Europe’, in S. E. Hooper, ed., The deeper causes of the war
(London, 1940), p. 152; R.B. Haldane, ‘The higher nationality ’ (1913), in Selected addresses and essays
(London, 1928).
54 On the failure of the concept of citizenship more generally to escape the ‘particularistic ’
formulations of nationhood – even when framed in the most universalistic, republican terms – see
A. Vincent, Nationalism and particularity (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 83–5.
55 Bosanquet, ‘The teaching of patriotism’, pp. 18–19 (my italics).
56 C. Noel, ‘Patriotism and the Christian faith’, in Oldershaw, ed., England, quoted in Grainger,
Patriotisms, p. 105.
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whether of God or humanity.57 An arch little-Englander who detested the idea
of the triumphalist nation spearheaded by the imperialist state, Chesterton
projected Kipling as a cosmopolitan rather than a patriot : Kipling merely ‘ad-
mired ’ England; he did not ‘ love’ it.58 Neither was Chesterton impressed by
fellow anti-imperialists such as Hobson (and by extension, Hobhouse) ; they were
not true friends of the patria to which they occasionally appealed for opportunistic
reasons but committed cosmopolitans. Implicitly, Chesterton put his ﬁnger on
their higher Millite and Cobdenite allegiances.59 He was also distanced from
them in his belief that the English nation had been progressively disenfranchised,
not least by the people’s newly acquired citizenship in a state-centred society.60
In this and other ways the contours of patriotism and associated conceptions of
the English and British nation/citizenry were hotly disputed in the decade or so
before the First World War. Chesterton himself attracted a wide following
through his many journalistic outlets, not least his weekly column, ‘Our
Notebook ’, in the Illustrated London News, which he wrote from 1905 until his death
in 1936. The unique ‘spirit ’ of each nation was the subject of his ﬁrst column in
which he cautioned readers against visiting only the famous sights at their holiday
destinations. These attractions were uniform in their grandeur, fashioned in
similar tastes and styles ; by contrast, the Parisian cafe´ and the London hansom
cab captured the essence of their respective societies and peoples. In its combi-
nation of luxury and danger the hansom cab was a symbol of the ‘aristocratic
individualism’ that pervaded English life, encapsulating the ‘courage and
commodiousness…which runs through innumerable English institutions ’.61 The
account was clearly meant to enhance awareness of and attachment to a
distinctively English culture and the people who had shaped it.
However, the fortunes of the active, campaigning style of Edwardian patriot-
ism were seriously aﬀected by the First World War, after which it was widely
57 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 105; see also Vincent’s fascinating discussion of the relationship between
religion and patriotism in Nationalism and particularity, pp. 127–33. Dismissing patriotism for its depen-
dence upon a religious duty of self-sacriﬁce that redounds solely to the advantage of the state, Vincent
fails to take account of the sense in Chesterton and others of ‘ love of country’ as a vital medium
between individuals and universals regardless of the state. Nations and states are often out of sync,
even when there is as near a congruence as possible between their boundaries.
58 G. K. Chesterton, Heretics (1908; London, 1905), p. 47.
59 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 107. In 1915, Chesterton attacked Hobson and the other ‘professors of a
clockwork politics ’ who in his view currently ruled England for suggesting that Germany could only be
‘punished’ by international arbitration, not war. Chesterton denied Hobson’s charge that he was a
‘romantic’, arguing that his views corresponded with ‘all the other people of Europe’ who saw more
clearly than Hobson that Germany was driven by the ‘ ‘‘ legend of the unconquerable man’’ ’ : The
Nation, 18 (4 Dec. 1915), p. 355.
60 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (London, 1936), pp. 211–13; Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton,
pp. 272–5.
61 G. K. Chesterton, ‘Our notebook’, ILN, 30 Sept. 1905, p. 454; see also his paean to the British
lion, symbolizing ‘ the aggregate good qualities of a kind of super-celestial country gentleman’ in the
same column, 28 Oct. 1905, p. 594. For all Chesterton’s radicalism, he by no means discounted entirely
the contribution of the aristocracy to English nationhood.
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condemned for its alleged association with militarism and chauvinism. English
national consciousness was certainly much strengthened as a result of the war,
not least in opposition to all things German.62 Yet at the same time, the carnage
in France seriously inhibited assertion of the claims and virtue of the English
patria.63 The shame and discredit into which the patriotic nation was now brought
would have been due in no small part to its eager annexation by popular
advocates of citizenship with the outbreak of war. In 1914 the women’s suﬀrage
movement, in particular, sought to ensure that no longer was citizenship
synonymous with male service to the state but universal service to the nation,
regardless of gender. But this reconﬁguration of citizenship failed to survive the
circumstances of war that produced it.64 The disquiet of the cultural elite in
particular with public displays of patriotism is evident in the refusal of W. R. Inge,
dean of St Pauls, and the cathedral chapter to allow the Royal Society of St
George to hold further annual services on St George’s Day in the cathedral after
the success of the event in 1923; permission only resumed with the new dean,
W. R. Matthews, in 1935. The Society’s appeal for money and new members at
the same time also fell on stony ground, a cause of some bitterness as its leaders
observed the ease with which a public normally cold to ‘abstract ideals which
it will not trouble to understand’ succumbed to ‘harrowing, blood-curdling,
illustrated appeals on behalf of ‘‘ starving ’’ Russians and other potential enemies
of our country ’.65
By contrast, the war strengthened the culture of citizenship still further, that
is, once the patriotic heat by which it had recently been aﬀected had been
drastically turned down and in some cases, oﬀ. This can be seen in the
foundation by a Scottish merchant and philanthropist, Sir Daniel Macaulay
Stevenson, of the annual series of lectures on Citizenship delivered to both the
university and city of Glasgow after the war. Reference has already been made to
Barker’s contribution as Lecturer in 1925–6.66 The ﬁrst series of lectures in 1922
was delivered by W. H. Hadow, vice-chancellor of the University of Sheﬃeld;
62 See J. M. Winter, ‘British national identity and the First World War’, in S. J. D. Green and
C. Whiting, eds., The boundaries of the state in modern Britain (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 268–9.
63 Grainger, Patriotisms, p. 329.
64 See N. F. Gullace, ‘The blood of our sons ’ : men, women and the renegotiation of British citizenship during the
great war (New York, 2002). As Gullace makes clear, nationhood failed to deliver the promise of the vote
to all women; instead, age and implicitly motherhood became the determinants of female suﬀrage in
1918. The prewar legacy of female citizenship was also lost, as Laura Mayhall makes clear in The
militant suﬀrage movement, conclusion.
65 See the correspondence between Howard Ruﬀ, honorary secretary of the Society, and Inge in
the Society’s journal, The English Race, 37 (Mar. 1925), pp. 6–7. In 1923, the sermon at the annual service
was delivered by the bishop of Durham, H. H. Henson. Ruﬀ protested against the willingness of the
dean and chapter to allow members of the Welsh church to hold their annual service in St Pauls on
St David’s eve, a service ‘of a distinctly racial character, including a military band, Welsh soloists
and choir ’.
66 For Barker’s experience of delivering each lecture twice on the same day, ﬁrst to university and
then to city audiences, see his Age and youth : memories of three universities and father of the man (London, 1953),
pp. 153, 194.
164 J U L I A S T A P L E TON
they set forth the Idealist theory of the state as a ‘ self-determined reality ’ along
the lines of Hadow’s mentor, Sir Henry Jones, who had recently died.67
Such echoes of this theory grew increasingly faint in the aftermath of
Hobhouse’s scathing attack upon Idealism’s Germanic foundations during
the war, and the development of logical positivism and other anti-Idealist
movements in philosophy since the turn of the century.68 However, Hadow’s
lectures set the tone for the renewal of the state’s primacy over the nation and
emphasized the continued robustness of the wider ethic of civic duty – suitably
detached from the sinister inﬂuence of nationalistic patriotism – which
Idealism had done so much to promote. The Oxford historian and recent
president of the Board of Education, H. A. L. Fisher, made this clear in a
uniformly hostile lecture on patriotism which formed part of his Stevenson series
in 1923. Arguing that patriotism was only serviceable to society when purged
of every last vestige of instinctive primitive emotion, he asked his audience to
consider
whether we have not reached a stage of evolution in which it is necessary that our notions
of patriotic duty should be revised, whether it is possible to maintain in full vigour the old
exclusiveness of the nation, whether war has not become so great a menace to civilization
that greater authority should be attached to such machinery as may be contrived for
averting it.69
Fisher’s life-long liberal accomplice and intellectual mainstay of the League of
Nations Union, Gilbert Murray, would have aﬃrmed both the possibility and
necessity of this movement in accordance with the twin pressures of ‘ liberality
and civilization’ at work in human history.70 The same would hold true of
other Edwardian ‘Hellenists ’ turned committed internationalists, for example,
A. E. Zimmern and Leonard Woolf. This stance co-existed rather uneasily with
high regard for the English contribution to political culture in the west – despite
its manifest shortcomings – especially in the worrying light of continental politics
after the war.71 Increasing appreciation of their own political culture dis-
tinguished the Hellenists from those associated with the pro-Soviet Left Book
Club, whose conceptions of citizenship as ‘comradeship ’ were far more militant
67 W. H. Hadow, Citizenship (Oxford, 1923), pp. 112, 216–22.
68 However, the tenets of Idealism continued to inform social and public policy after the war: see
J. Harris, ‘Political thought and the welfare state, 1870–1940: an intellectual framework for British
social policy’, Past and Present, 35 (1992), pp. 116–41.
69 H. A. L. Fisher, The common weal (Oxford, 1924), pp. 98, 114.
70 G. Murray, Liberality and civilization, The Hibbert Lectures (London, 1938), pp. 41–6.
71 A. E. Zimmern, ‘The evolution of a citizen’, in O. Stanley, ed., The way out (London, 1923), pp. 22,
29, 35; on Woolf, see F. M. Levanthal, ‘Leonard Woolf, 1880–1969: the conscience of a Bloomsbury
socialist ’, in S. Pedersen and P. Mandler, eds., After the Victorians : private conscience and public duty in modern
Britain (London, 1994), pp. 160–1. For Murray’s admiration for English life as shaped by the Victorians
and as the embodiment of civilization more widely, see F. West, Gilbert Murray : a life (London, 1984),
pp. 229–30. For the contradictions in liberal internationalist thought during the interwar period, see
P. Wilson, The international theory of Leonard Woolf : a study in twentieth-century Idealism (New York, 2003) ; and
J. Moreﬁeld, Covenants without swords : Idealist liberalism and the spirit of empire (Princeton, NJ, 2005).
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in tone.72 Nevertheless, Hellenist-inspired views of citizenship were still worlds
away from the stronger culture of patriotism and associated spirit of nationhood,
now under a dark cloud.
Yet the province of patriotism more narrowly focused on the nation in the
interwar years was by no means conﬁned – in Grainger’s words – to a few
‘obsessed individuals ’ : Churchill, Mosley, Beaverbrook, Rothermere, Hugh
Sellon, Hillaire Belloc, Lord Eustace Percy, Lord Lloyd, and Sir Arnold Wilson,
for example.73 Or at least if it was, some of these ﬁgures enjoyed marked public
success in beating the patiotic drum against considerable odds. As a result, two
distinct and mutually suspicious cultures remain perceptible.
One individual who pursued indefatigably the cause of patriotism in this way
was the historian and Conservative party activist, Arthur Bryant. He developed
a substantial middlebrow audience in the interwar period through pageants,
journalism, and historical biography – much of this inspired by the historian,
G. M. Trevelyan, one of few ﬁgures among the intellectual elite who actively
sought to enhance English patriotism and national identity.74 Bryant’s
‘Greenwich Night Pageant ’ in 1933 which celebrated England’s historic mastery
of the sea in the shadow of the Washington Naval Treaties involved a cast of 2,000
and ran for ten nights before audiences of 12,000. His biographies of Macaulay,
Charles II, and Pepys consciously played the patriotic card to considerable
commercial and critical acclaim, as did the weekly column in the Illustrated London
News he inherited from Chesterton in 1936.75 Growing up before the war in the
precincts of Buckingham Palace where his father was a court oﬃcial, he was
inﬂuenced by both Chesterton and Kipling ; in the adverse climate of the interwar
period he sought to reconcile their local and imperial conceptions of patriotism.76
The outbreak of new hostilities between diﬀering conceptions of the relationship
of citizenship to patriotism and their respective publics is especially apparent
in Bryant’s role in the Association for Education in Citizenship (AEC) in the
mid-1930s.
72 The archetype of Left Book Club thinking in this respect was John Strachey’s The coming struggle for
power (1932; London, 1934). On the Left Book Club, see S. Samuels, ‘The Left Book Club’, Journal of
Contemporary History, 1 (1966), pp. 65–86; and P. Laity, ed., Left Book Club anthology (London, 2001).
73 Grainger, Patriotisms, pp. 353–5.
74 For Bryant’s relationship with Trevelyan in the 1930s, see J. Stapleton, Sir Arthur Bryant and national
history in twentieth-century Britain (Lanham, MD, forthcoming), ch. 3.
75 On the Greenwich pageant see The Times, 17 June 1933, p. 9a; King Charles II (London, 1931) sold
27,000 copies within eighteen months; the third volume of Bryant’s biography of Pepys, Samuel Pepys :
the saviour of the navy (Cambridge, 1938), was serialized in The Sunday Times. However, Bryant’s patriotic
writings for the Illustrated London News were mercilessly criticized by the Left, especially as they un-
derpinned his support for appeasement and sympathy for Nazism and fascism in the late 1930s : see
R. H. S. Crossman, ‘Sedatives, mild and strong’, New Statesman and Nation (19 Feb. 1938), p. 294.
76 Bryant wrote of his enduring boyhood admiration of Chesterton as a ‘great English prophet’,
and of his special delight in Chesterton’s prose book, The ﬂying inn (1914) as ‘a great poem on the
English soul ’, in a letter to Chesterton, 16 Dec. 1933, British Library Add. MSS 73235, fo. 170; he
praised Kipling’s ‘wake-up’ call to Britain in Kipling’s poem, ‘Recessional’ and other works in English
saga (1840–1940) (London, 1940), pp. 253–6.
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The Association had been formed in 1934 with the Liberal MP for
Wythenshawe, Ernest Simon, as ﬁrst president.77 He was succeeded by
W. H. Hadow a year later.78 Seeking a conservative balance to its predominantly
liberal and progressive shade of political opinion – and one which would rec-
ommend the Association to the deputy prime minister, Stanley Baldwin – Simon
invited Bryant to join the executive committee.79 Foremost among the AEC’s
concerns was the defence of democracy against the rising tide of dictatorship in
Europe; to this end, Simon and inﬂuential associates such as William Beveridge
began a campaign to introduce citizenship education in schools, universities, and
extra-mural teaching. High on the Association’s agenda was the cultivation of
independent judgement in citizens, together with the moral qualities necessary
to ensure the survival of democracy; echoing earlier antipathy in Britain to in-
culcating patriotism in the nation’s youth directly, it eschewed the narrow
teaching of ‘civics ’ along with the crude political education that underlay the
nascent authoritarian states of Europe.80 As Barker (a member of the AEC’s
council) argued in a lecture of 1936, ‘civic training has its place ’, but it is
‘ secondary’ to the end of educating ‘whole ’ men – not ‘miles pro patria [soldiers for
the fatherland] nor even cives pro civitate [citizens for the state] ’. He continued,
If civic training be pressed to the detriment of humanity, in the highest and ﬁnest sense of
that word – and that is what seems to me to be happening in Germany – it will go badly
with our Universities, as I think it is going badly in Germany, and it will go badly with our
national culture.81
Bryant would not have disagreed with this principle ; however, he did challenge
its application in the statement of the AEC’s ‘aims’. His main point of dissent
centred on the suggestion that citizens of Britain should identify with the
wider world as well as their own country, and that they ‘must be prepared to
make sacriﬁces for international goodwill and co-operation’.82 Bryant’s response
emphasizes the division of the two cultures along Left–Right lines under the
77 On the connections between Simon’s vision of democracy and the class prejudices that informed
his judgement of the Wythenshawe housing estate with which he and his wife were closely associ-
ated, see A. Olechnowicz, ‘Civic leadership and education for democracy: the Simons and the
Wythenshawe estate ’, Contemporary British History, 14 (2000), pp. 3–26.
78 Hadow’s main contribution to the Association was the compiling of its Bibliography of social studies :
a list of books for schools and adults (London, 1936).
79 Simon to Bryant, 27 Nov. 1934, Bryant papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s
College London, C/28, ﬁle 1. Bryant’s close relationship to Baldwin in the 1930s is explored in
Stapleton, Sir Arthur Bryant, chs. 5 and 6, passim. Baldwin became president of the Association when he
retired from politics in 1938. There are hints of political diﬃculties within the Association during
Baldwin’s presidency in G. Batho, ‘The history of the teaching of civics and citizenship in English
Schools ’, Curriculum Journal, 1 (1990), pp. 91–100, at p. 95.
80 Executive committee of the Association for Education in Citizenship, ‘The aims of education’,
Bryant papers, C/28, ﬁle 1.
81 E. Barker, ‘The teaching of politics ’ (1936), in The citizen’s choice (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 161–2.
82 Executive committee of the Association for Education in Citizenship, ‘The aims of education’,
pp. 14–15.
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mounting strain of interwar politics. At issue was his opposition to disarmament, a
goal which pervaded citizenship culture in many of its diverse interwar forms. It
was a stance which constituted a running theme in his eﬀorts to save Britain from
those on the Left whom he perceived as too ready to surrender the country’s
status as a world power and force for international good, as much as those on
the Right for whom the associated ‘glory ’ had become an end in itself.83 He
suggested that Simon remove the oﬀending phrase. ‘We all agree with it ’,
he declared,
but unfortunately the Opposition to the present Government have made, what I might call
the waving of the Peace Flag, a party prerogative, in rather the same way as the older
Tories made the waving of the Union Jack, so that, coupled with the [mainly Liberal and
Labour] names on our note-paper this phrase also may suggest to some a tendency to the
Left.84
Bryant’s inﬂuence on further drafts of the Association’s ‘aims ’ is unclear. His
concern to test the cross-party aspirations of the AEC’s leadership to the limit
certainly paid oﬀ when he secured – against much opposition – the Conservative
party’s adult education college at Ashridge as the venue for the ﬁrst conference of
the Association in 1937.85 However, the diﬃculty of accommodating Left and
Right on the issue of citizenship and democracy in the tense ideological climate
of the late 1930s is evident in the aftermath of the conference proceedings. A
shortened version of Bryant’s address appeared in The Highway, the journal of
the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA). Here, he discussed the nature of
citizenship in the context of democracy as practised in ‘old England’.
Every one of us who has English blood can be certain, whatever his social rank or birth, of
having in his ancestry many humble progenitors who probably could neither read nor
write, but who served their year as parish constable or some other village oﬃcer, and
learned thereby the hard lessons of self-government. They learned that government is not a
mere question of making rules and giving orders, but of patience, persuasion and
compromise.86
This struck just the right note as far as the goal – pursued by the AEC and the
WEA alike – of strengthening democratic involvement throughout all classes of
society was concerned. Far less successful was Bryant’s insistence on contrasting
83 Bryant was an early opponent of disarmament : see his The spirit of conservatism (London, 1929),
pp. 168–9. He continued to regard Britain as the greatest force for peace and international unity after
1945; by contrast, he held a low view of the United Nations. This is evidenced by his support for the
Suez venture, on which see ILN, 17 Nov. 1956, p. 834, 29 Sept. 1956, p. 494, and 26 Jan. 1957, p. 130.
84 Bryant to Simon, 6 Dec. 1934, Bryant papers, C/28, ﬁle 1.
85 The full conference proceedings appeared in E. Simon et al., Constructive democracy (London, 1938).
On the opposition Bryant encountered to the choice of Ashridge as conference venue, see his letter to
Sir Geoﬀrey Fry dated 19 Jan. 1937 in Bryant papers, C/53. The successful outcome for Ashridge was
recorded in the minutes of the education committee, 15 Apr. 1937, Bryant papers, C/53.
86 A. Bryant, ‘The foundations of democracy’, The Highway, 30 (Dec. 1937), pp. 38–46, at p. 45 ;
reprinted in full as ‘The foundations of British democracy’, Humanity in politics (London, 1937),
pp. 75–95, and in Simon et al., Constructive democracy, pp. 51–75.
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the historic, English experience of democracy with its contemporary practice in
‘Red Spain ’. This provoked vitriolic outrage among internationalist readers of
The Highway, who regarded citizenship as a matter of working-class honour which
knew no national bounds. Even the editor was embarrassed.87 The episode
indicates that at some points relations between the discourses of patriotism
and citizenship just before the outbreak of the Second World War were at
breaking-point.
I V
Conﬂict on the issue of the relationship between patriotism and citizenship in
education along Left–Right lines continued unabated during the Second World
War. Harold Laski – a member of the AEC’s council – used one of his wartime
polemics to castigate a report on the educational aims of Reconstruction pub-
lished by the Conservative party in 1942. Emboldened by the threat to national
survival of the previous two years, the Conservative sub-committee on education
chaired by Sir Geoﬀrey Faber called for a conscious sense of nationhood to be
imparted in schools, alongside clear religious instruction. No longer could the
country aﬀord to be suspicious of these ends, as the Spens committee on sec-
ondary education had been between 1932 and 1938 against the backdrop of Nazi
and fascist extremism and a succession of attempts to undermine the inﬂuence of
denominational religion. The education sub-committee was conﬁdent that the
fascist subordination of the individual to the state could be avoided; it was not a
case of the state manufacturing a national esprit de corps but of recognizing
the ‘recovered fact of national solidarity ’ in peacetime educational policy. One
element of the proposal was to ensure a ‘warmly felt understanding on [the
citizen’s] part of his country’s place and task in the world’.88 At the same time, the
report assumed an equivalence between national consciousness and identity on
the one hand, and loyalty to the state on the other.
This unabashed identiﬁcation of nationhood with statehood in the context of
full citizenship was a signiﬁcant development in patriotic and citizenship dis-
courses alike. It was, however, a minority view. For Laski, the Conservative party
report was wholly at odds with the true ethos of citizenship – correctly perceived
by the Spens committee – in which the state was merely an instrument of
the development of individual citizens ; the state was not an end in itself deﬁned
in spurious national terms which thinly disguised the interests of property.
The whole tone of the report, Laski maintained, was indicative of the ‘counter-
revolution’ sweeping across Britain no less than the European continent ; this was
the fascist attempt to re-enthrone the rule of privilege against the struggle for
87 W. E. Williams, ‘The Bryant aﬀair ’, The Highway, 30 (Feb. 1938), pp. 97–100.
88 ‘Looking ahead ’ : educational aims : being the ﬁrst interim report of the Conservative sub-committee on education
(London: The Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction set up by the Conservative and
Unionist Party Organization, 1942), Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford, p. 12.
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personal and class liberation which had been waged since 1917.89 What is so
astounding is that many in the higher echelons of the Conservative party agreed,
including the minister of education – R. A. Butler – who had commissioned the
report and an accompanying one on youth training. The Green and White
Papers which formed the basis of the 1944 Education Act were drawn up largely
on the advice of civil servants and eschewed the strong corporate and religious
ideals that had exercised the sub-committee. As Jose´ Harris has argued, a
major factor in William Beveridge’s success as a wartime social reformer was
that – unlike Faber’s committee – he reigned in the ‘organicist ’ presuppositions
of his argument, giving greater prominence to their ‘contractualist ’ counter-
parts.90 This may explain Beveridge’s popularity in elite circles, ever suspicious as
they were of the sliding scale between ‘organicism’ and nationalism.
In his essay The lion and the unicorn of 1941 George Orwell famously saw things
diﬀerently from Marxist intellectuals such as Laski, ‘ severed’ as they were from
the ‘common culture of the country’. Unlike Laski, he believed that the ‘existing
pattern of vested interests ’ had developed something that was widely acclaimed in
English society : a ‘belief in ‘‘ the law’’ as something above the State and above
the individual ’. Orwell regarded national identity more broadly as a force which
cut across the boundaries of class, especially with the recent expansion of the
middle class, in much the same way that the progressive elite had looked to shared
citizenship based on a conception of the common good for the best part of half a
century. Hitherto, the nation’s destiny had been determined by the privileged
few; but now, amid the perils of wartime, it required the input of an England
‘ that is only just beneath the surface, in the factories and the newspaper oﬃces, in
the aeroplanes and the submarines ’. For Orwell at this time, socialism, citizen-
ship, and democracy were inseparable from patriotism: ‘no real revolutionary
has ever been an internationalist ’, he deﬁantly remarked.91
During the war Orwell’s intervention strengthened the faith of other non-
Marxist thinkers on the Left in the capacity of the mass of the English people to
retain their political and cultural independence while identifying with, and par-
ticipating fully in, the wider nation: Tom Harrisson of the Mass Observation
movement and J. B. Priestley are cases in point.92 Subsequently, he was praised
by E. M. Forster for his down-to-earth patriotism and belief in ‘ ‘‘ the people ’’,
89 H. J. Laski, Reﬂections on the revolution of our time (London, 1943), pp. 295–301.
90 On the Mannheimian context of the various reports of the education sub-committee and their
reception, together with analysis of rival ideals of state welfare, see J. Harris, ‘Political ideas and the
debate on state welfare, 1940–1945’, in H. Smith, ed., War and social change : British society in the Second
World War (Manchester, 1986).
91 G. Orwell, The lion and the unicorn : socialism and the English genius, intro. by B. Crick (1941; London,
1982), pp. 63, 44, 85, and 115.
92 See M. Taylor, ‘Patriotism, history, and the Left in twentieth-century Britain’, Historical Journal,
33 (1990), pp. 971–87, at pp. 980–3. On Priestley’s successful appeal to the ‘nation’ in terms of ‘ the
people ’, the cause of reconstruction he served early in the war, and the crisis this caused at the BBC,
see S. Nicholas, ‘‘ ‘Sly demagogues’’ and wartime radio: J. B. Priestley and the BBC’, Twentieth Century
British History, 6 (1995), pp. 247–66.
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who, with their beefy arms akimbo and their cabbage-stalk soup, may survive
when higher growths are cut down’.93 However, his attempt to ground socialist
conceptions of revolution and solidarity in English national culture made little
wider impact. Orwell himself beat a hasty retreat and in 1947 embraced the idea of
a socialist ‘United States of Europe’.94 When socialism found a new, ‘revisionist ’
voice in Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins, class conﬂict was again resolved in
common citizenship, as it had been earlier in the century. But although not
directly attacked, national identity and patriotism barely featured in this revival of
an earlier discourse ; citizenship was focused instead on shared standards of living
in conditions of rising prosperity. Recent research has shown that Crosland was
sensitive to socialism’s traditional concern with the ‘ improvement of minds ’ as
well as material conditions, and to the happiness and psychological well-being
that were central to earlier conceptions of citizenship. However, he gave priority
to a functional rather than ethical/national view of the state on which citizenship
discourse had traded – if obliquely – previously. This was accompanied by a shift
of perspective away from the public status of citizens to the quality of their private
lives.95
A major inﬂuence on this development was the post-war sociologist,
T. H.Marshall. ForMarshall, citizenship denotedmerely the equal right to certain
beneﬁts and services ensured by legislation – the culmination of a movement
which had extended ﬁrst civil rights, then political rights, and ﬁnally social
rights to the population as a whole. Citizenship, in its ﬁnal, mature phase in
mid-twentieth-century Britain, was a form of social integration based not on the
‘ sphere of sentiment ’ which prevailed in the kinship system of pre-feudal
societies, nor the ‘patriotic nationalism’ engendered by political reform, but a
common level of ‘material enjoyment ’.96 Marshall’s conception of citizenship
accorded well with the authority which the British state enjoyed in the immediate
post-war period, eclipsing the various component nationalisms within the United
Kingdom.97 But at the same time it squeezed the culture of patriotism that had
found new heart and voices during the Second World War.
93 E. M. Forster, ‘George Orwell ’ (1950), in Two cheers for democracy (1951; Harmondsworth, 1965),
p. 71. 94 J. Newsinger, Orwell’s politics (London, 1999), pp. 108, 150–4.
95 J. Nuttall, ‘The Labour party and the improvement of minds: the case of Tony Crosland’,
Historical Journal, 46 (2003), pp. 133–53; see also C. Ellis, ‘ ‘‘Total abstinence and a good ﬁling system’’?
Anthony Crosland and the aﬄuent society’, in L. Black and H. Pemberton, eds., An aﬄuent society?
Britain’s post-war ‘Golden Age ’ revisited (Andover, 2004) ; and L. Black, The political culture of the Left in aﬄuent
Britain, 1951–1964 (Basingstoke, 2003), ch. 6.
96 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class : and other essays (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 40–1, 47.
Marshall’s essay is quoted by Crosland in defence of his ideal of social equality in The future of socialism
(London, 1956), pp. 84–5, 118.
97 On the greater prominence of ‘British nationalism’ during the war – and its immediate
aftermath – see C. Harvie, ‘The moment of British nationalism, 1939–1970’, Political Quarterly, 71
(2000), pp. 328–40. On the ‘persistence ’ of Britishness alongside Englishness for much of the twentieth
century, but particularly during and after the Second World War, see Kumar, The making of English
national identity, pp. 233–9. Richard Weight has contested the idea that ‘Britain’ retained its strength as
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VIn this context the British Nationality Act of 1948 met little eﬀective opposition
among British intellectuals of either the Right or the Left. The Act replaced the
status of British subjecthood in the common code of 1914 with a new category of
United Kingdom and Colonies Citizenship (CUKC).98 With the exception of
Enoch Powell neither the Conservative nor Labour party intelligentsia rushed to
the defence of the embattled patria in the face of the mass immigration which
followed (although the response of the Labour party, at least, was not without
considerable ambiguity).99 The ensuing controversy reopened the division
between intellectual and popular opinion in Britain that had developed earlier in
the century, although on a far more explosive scale. This casts doubt on a recent
claim by Kathleen Paul that public opinion could have been ‘educated’ by pol-
itical elites into accepting mass immigration, with all the attenuation of the sense
of cultural Englishness that this implies. Instead, she claims that policy makers
deliberately set about fostering a climate of public hostility towards immigrants ;
this would ease the path towards the ‘racist ’ immigration control these leaders
sought to take, and did take in 1962 with the passing of the Commonwealth
Immigrants Act under R. A. Butler, now home secretary. But she underestimates
Powell’s diﬀerences with other members of the governing elite ; also, the weight of
patriotic tradition he succeeded in tapping in Britain.100 While government
ministers, oﬃcials, and politicians may have been ‘racist ’, their concern about
mass immigration did not extend to its possible eﬀect in weakening patriotism
and the common loyalties and attachments that had traditionally underpinned
nationhood in Britain. This, however, was central to Powell’s attack. At the same
time, the extent of the departure of Powell’s arguments against the scale of im-
migration in post-war Britain from previous conceptions of citizenship, nation-
hood, and patriotism should not be exaggerated.
a focus of patriotic allegiance in the post-war period in Patriots : national identity in Britain, 1940–2000
(London, 2002).
98 See the illuminating recent book by R. Karatani, Deﬁning British citizenship : empire, commonwealth and
modern Britain (London, 2003), p. 117. On the racist, sexist, and class bias in the common code in
practice, see K. Paul, Whitewashing Britain : race and citizenship in the postwar era (Ithaca, NY, 1997), ch. 1.
For details of the background of the common code, see n. 51 above.
99 On this ambiguity, see S. Fielding, ‘Brotherhood and the brothers: responses to ‘‘coloured’’
immigration in the British Labour party, c. 1951–1965’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 3 (1998), pp. 79–97.
Philip Lynch’s claim that Enoch Powell’s conception of British citizenship was inimical to the task of
‘modernization’ in the 1970s fails to take account of the receptivity of Labour leaders such as Hugh
Gaitskell, Michael Foot, Peter Shore, and Tony Benn also to a conception of the distinctiveness and
independence of England-Britain, however loath they were to invoke it against mass immigration: see
his The politics of nationhood: sovereignty, Britishness, and Conservative politics (London, 1999), p. 46.
100 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, ch. 5. Powell’s position, according to Paul, ‘usually identiﬁed as
‘‘extreme’’, which became synonymous in popular lore with opposition to ‘‘coloured immigration’’ in
the 1960s and 1970s actually fell within the realm of established ‘‘oﬃcial ’’ conceptions of British
nationality ’ : p. 178.
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In siding with popular opinion, Powell sought to deﬁne citizenship in terms of
nationality and patriotism, and that of a distinctly English kind. As Karatani has
recently emphasized, only Powell among anti-immigration MPs lobbied for a
form of citizenship that was exclusive to the United Kingdom; most were con-
cerned simply to limit immigration from the new commonwealth, not least to
relieve pressure on public services.101 Powell’s hostility to the British empire and
commonwealth aside, he did so in much the same way as Bryant had defended
English identity in the 1930s and continued to do through his proliﬁc journalism
and stream of patriotic histories in the post-war period.102 Both men emphasized
that English patriotism – its latency so long a source of national strength –
was now at an alarming discount. To Bryant’s mind, at least, this was due to
concerted campaigns of disparagement over several generations by the intellectual
elite, a point to which we will return in the ﬁnal section of this article. Powell and
Bryant alike were committed to reigniting English national pride, if necessary
through treading on increasingly raw Scottish, Welsh, and Irish nerves.103 Powell
shared fully Bryant’s romantic conception of English nationhood and stressed its
roots in instinct rather than reason.104 Neither in Bryant’s writings nor Powell’s
speeches was there a simple association between nationalism, patriotism, and
raison d ’e´tat, as the opposition of both men to Britain’s entry to Europe and the
dirigisme of post-war social democracy well illustrates.105
At the same time, Powell was not so distant from the assumption – albeit ta-
cit – of the pre-war liberal elite that national homogeneity and allegiance are
integral to all good citizenship. Most of all he reiterated their view that citizenship
entails a primary relationship between individuals and national polities which
101 Karatani, Deﬁning British citizenship, pp. 152–3. Support for Powell’s policies – if not his inﬂam-
matory language – came from unexpected quarters, for example his fellow Wolverhampton MP and
admirer of Eastern Germany, Renee Short. She called for limits to immigration and the dispersal
of fresh immigrants away from areas of high concentration: see her obituary in The Daily Telegraph,
20 Jan. 2003.
102 Bryant attacked Powell’s dismissal of the commonwealth as ‘humbug’ in ILN, 25 Jan. 1969, p. 12.
On the character, sales, and reception of Bryant’s post-war histories see Stapleton, Sir Arthur Bryant,
ch. 13.
103 Bryant, ILN, 14 June 1958, p. 996, and 1 Nov. 1958, p. 738; Powell, speech to the Royal Society of
St George, 22 Apr. 1961, in J. Wood, ed., Freedom and reality (London, 1969), p. 257. Simon Heﬀer gives
the correct date of the speech as 1961 (Wood gives it as 1964 in Freedom and reality) in Like the Roman: the
life of Enoch Powell (London, 1998), p. 982. Although a member of the council of the Royal Society of St
George, it is not clear if Bryant attended the dinner at which the speech was delivered, although many
years later he quoted from it in ILN, May 1978, p. 31.
104 Powell’s romantic conception of English nationhood is emphasized by Heﬀer in Like the Roman,
pp. 153, 336–40; for an example of Bryant’s similar conception, see The age of elegance, 1812–1822
(London, 1950), p. 282.
105 Powell’s conception of the greater wisdom of the (English) people over corporate acts of
government is illustrated by a speech he gave in Bromsgrove in 1963, see J. Wood, ed., A nation not afraid
(London, 1965), p. 26. While Bryant believed that Powell was too inﬂexible an advocate of laissez-faire,
he was likewise concerned about the adverse eﬀects on English freedom of the increasing regulation of
British society by the post-war state : see, for example, ILN, 22 May 1965, p. 12, 5 Dec. 1970, p. 12, and
9 Jan. 1960, p. 42.
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cannot conﬂict with other identities and loyalties, although it might not exclude
them altogether.106 His conception of citizenship as rooted in individual
allegiance explains his opposition to the Nationality Act of 1948 which grouped
together nine commonwealth legislatures in the new category of CUKC, thus
severing the direct link between subject and sovereign.107 As he remarked in
debate on the second reading of the Royal Titles Bill in 1953, the duty of
allegiance integral to citizenship overruled all ‘ individual, local, and partial
interests ’. He certainly departed from earlier theorists in insisting that citizenship
was not a rational tie ; it embodied ‘ that minimum, basic, instinctive recognition of
belonging to a greater whole which involves the ultimate consequence in certain
circumstances of self-sacriﬁce in the interests of the whole ’.108 This did not rule
out immigration per se, although it did exclude large concentrations of immigrant
communities within the wider nation.109 For Powell, the mediation of a person’s
citizenship by sub-national identities would undermine the universal nature of
citizenship within societies, generating the communalism that had plagued
India.110 However, in this he echoed Barker’s view earlier in the century that an
overarching nationalism was a precondition of citizenship and the only prospect
for democracy in India. There are also strains in Powell of the wider view of the
Idealists that citizenship signiﬁed identity in diﬀerence: for Bosanquet, the state
based on citizenship gathers up at the same time as it transcends group diﬀerence
in one ‘unifying ’, integrating sovereignty.111
The aﬃnities between Powell and earlier intellectuals do not of course imply
that they would have expressed themselves in quite the same way in the face of
mass immigration: the Idealists and others were never challenged by events or
critics to examine the beliefs about nationhood which underpinned their ideal
of ‘common’ citizenship. But the assumptions they shared with Powell are
important ; arguably these commonalities outweigh more obvious diﬀerences of
political style and temperament when compared with developments in citizenship
discourse in the late 1980s and beyond.
V I
The unity which Powell sought to forge between citizenship, patriotism, and
English identity in post-war Britain found its sharpest critics on the Left in the
last decade of the twentieth century, when the immigration debate had subsided.
This challenge to Powell was part of an attempt to make citizenship integral to a
new egalitarian vision based on reform of the state as much as economic power.
Committed to multiculturalism on the one hand and radical democracy on
the other, thinkers on the Left reinterpreted citizenship as the recognition of
106 On Powell’s conception of the individual basis of citizenship, see Heﬀer, Like the Roman, p. 450.
107 Powell, speech in the House of Commons, 3 Mar. 1953, in Wood, ed., Freedom and reality, p. 193.
108 Ibid., pp. 194–5 (my emphasis). 109 Heﬀer, Like the Roman, p. 474.
110 See his unrepentent remarks on the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary of the Birmingham speech quoted
in Heﬀer, Like the Roman, pp. 939–40. 111 Bosanquet, Philosophical theory of the state, pp. liv–ix.
174 J U L I A S T A P L E TON
diﬀerence not sameness and the empowerment of groups rather than the
participation of individuals in a scheme of rights and duties common to all
members of society.112
Traditional, stable, inherited identities at national level cut little ice here.
Citizenship deﬁned in terms of personal allegiance fostered by a broad spirit of
patriotism and tied to a unitary national culture was ruled out ab initio in favour
of European attachments, especially.113 This entailed the jettisoning of the ideal of
citizenship developed by liberal intellectuals at the turn of the last century as a
‘creed’ and instrument of national cohesion, as much as the stronger culture of
the nation associated with Conservative concepts of citizenship from the 1960s to
the 1980s. Citizenship was now a function of composite and shifting national
identities. At one level the only patriotism contemplated as its handmaid was of
a speciﬁc, constitutional kind: loyalty to a constitution and set of political
procedures.114 This has given the recent impetus to citizenship education in
schools focused squarely on the organization of political power ; in turn it has
encountered considerable opposition on a range of fronts, not least its exclusion of
wider moral and cultural perspectives centred on ‘community ’ values.115 The
distance between Sir Henry Jones and Sir Bernard Crick, who has inspired much
of this eﬀort to develop a new culture of citizenship, could not be wider. This is
despite a continuing emphasis on universal rights determined by supra-national
principles.
Some political thinkers have expressed unease with so radical a revision of the
concept of citizenship. For example, David Miller has written extensively in
the last decade on the need for the connections between citizenship, patriotism,
and nationalism to be maintained in at least something of the range of their
conventional form. He argues that constitutional patriotism is an inadequate basis
for citizenship in complex modern societies ; instead, the stronger cement of
national culture is required. But the national culture he envisages is essentially
porous, requiring the ‘adapt[ation of] the inherited culture to make room for
minority communities ’. Miller stops short of multiculturalism in insisting that
the civic education that is to serve such societies should contain a ‘unitary
core ’, in addition to a ‘periphery that is ﬂexible to serve the needs of
minorities ’.116 In recent work he defends a participatory, republican model of
citizenship against a less exacting liberal (and libertarian) one, but emphasizes
112 See G. Andrews, ed., Citizenship (London, 1991), esp. G. Andrews, ‘ Introduction’ ; D. Held,
‘Between state and civil society : citizenship’ ; and B. Parekh, ‘British citizenship and cultural diﬀer-
ence’.
113 See B. Crick, ed., Citizens : towards a citizenship culture (Oxford, 2001), esp. B. Crick, ‘ Introduction’ ;
Y. Alibhai-Brown, ‘After multiculturalism’ ; and N. Ascherson, ‘How European can we be/will we be’.
114 This is at the root of the recent (Crick) report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship, Education for
citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools (London, 1998). See the review by N. Pearce and
S. Spencer, ‘Education for citizenship: the Crick report ’, Political Quarterly, 70 (1999), pp. 219–24, esp.
the quotation on p. 221, second column.
115 E. Frazer, ‘Citizenship education: anti-political culture and political education in Britain’,
Political Studies, 48 (2000), pp. 88–103. 116 D. Miller, On nationality (Oxford, 1995), p. 181.
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the importance of a shared national identity to its success.117 Yet like the multi-
culturalists he believes that citizenship is mediated through a welter of communal
identities and is always provisional, in terms of both its internal structure and the
allegiance it can command.
If the legacy of intellectuals earlier in the century concerning the ideal of citi-
zenship has been obscured by multicultural conceptions of nationhood on the one
hand and narrower, political understandings of citizenship on the other, its
patriotic rival has proved more resilient, if ever defensive. The championing of
homogeneous English nationhood and the patriotic values to which it was once
securely hitched is evident in recent historiography.118 It is also apparent in
attempts to renew conservative thought by philosophers, journalists, and sub-
stantial parts of the Conservative party itself.119 Much of this movement has
grown out of opposition to increasing integration with Europe; devolution and
the perceived shallowness and instability of multicultural visions of Britain have
played their role too, as has the lowering of the tone of patriotism in football
hooliganism and other areas of popular culture.120
The close aﬃnities between this resurgence of English national consciousness
and a similar movement a half-century and more earlier can be seen in Roger
Scruton’s recent ‘elegy ’ for England. Scruton sets out to explain what England
was before its strengths and successes were sapped by derision and repudiation
from within, particularly by the intelligentsia. Like Jonathan Clark, he rejects the
idea that England has ever been subject to a process of ‘nation-building ’ ; but
unlike Clark he emphasizes England’s possession of ‘corporate personality ’
shaped by time, circumstances, and, above all, place. Chief among the factors
which transformed place into ‘home’ was religion. ‘This religion grew with the
language, which it profoundly inﬂuenced, and by which it was inﬂuenced in turn.
It determined the musical, architectural and storytelling traditions of the country
at large, and was the single most importance source of the customs whereby
English society renewed itself. ’121 This strikes resonant chords with the central
claim of Bryant’s histories in the 1950s and 60s that the English people developed
into a distinct and cohesive national whole by their conversion to, and missionary
extension of Christianity, equated with no less a cause than civilization itself. It
was St Boniface, Bryant conﬁdently asserted, who ‘wrote the ﬁrst chapter in the
history of the expansion of English ideals beyond the seas ’.122 The sense of both
117 D. Miller, Citizenship and national identity (Cambridge, 2002), ch. 5.
118 R. Fraser, A people’s history of Britain (London, 2003).
119 Kumar, The making of English national identity, pp. 264–8.
120 S. Heﬀer, Nor shall my sword : the reinvention of England (London, 1999), pp. 42–4.
121 R. Scruton, England: an elegy (2000; London, 2001), pp. 81–2. A related account of ‘Englishness ’
as rooted in artistic styles and sensibility rather than nationalism as such, and above all focused on
‘place’ and reverence for the past, is P. Ackroyd, Albion : the origins of the English imagination (London,
2002).
122 A. Bryant, The story of England: makers of the realm (London, 1953), p. 91. He was moved to write of
St Boniface that ‘No Englishman’s work has had a greater inﬂuence on the world. The German
Gothic cathedrals, the testimony of Luther, the Christian music of Schu¨ltz and Bach all sprang from
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Scruton and Simon Heﬀer that England has been heavily undermined – in
Scruton’s case beyond recall – by the contempt of the intellectual elite and a
range of publicists also has strong parallels with Bryant : concerned to rescue the
national pride and integrity of ‘humble ’ English people from the sneers of
Bloomsbury and intellectuals on the Left, Bryant became the devoted literary
champion of the patriotic classes.123
None of the more recent defenders of Englishness, or Britishness thinly veiled
as Englishness, eschew the language of common citizenship; indeed, the
journalist Peter Hitchens makes powerful reference to it. He picks up the dis-
course of virtue that has dropped out of the culture of citizenship in its refocusing
of community on ‘rights ’ and the recognition of diversity. But he does so in
connection with what was lost in the accelerated process of destruction in the late
twentieth century of both the culture and landscape of a determinate ‘people ’,
once so vigilant about the habits, institutions, religion, and ideas by which they
self-consciously deﬁned themselves.124 Despairing of the Conservative party’s
ability ever to resolve its state of chronic internal division, he has argued the case
for a British movement to help raise the old England-Britain, phoenix-like, from
the ashes.125 The spirit behind Hitchens’s understanding of the term ‘common
citizenship’ contrasts sharply with the recent Report into the future of multi-ethnic
Britain chaired by Bikhu Parekh. This views citizenship in terms of accommo-
dating a welter of cultural diﬀerences in public life, and looks askance at the idea
that there was ever a public culture that was truly reﬂective of the beliefs and
outlook of a discernible ‘majority ’.126 It is a salutary reﬂection that few readers are
likely to absorb both Hitchens and Heﬀer on the one hand, and Parekh and
Miller on the other, except for polemical purposes. By contrast, it is not incon-
ceivable that their early twentieth-century equivalents, for example Chesterton
and Barker or Gilbert Murray, would have partially shared a common audience
in forums such as The Nation and the Home University Library.
Clearly, tension between concepts of citizenship and of patriotism deeply em-
bedded in English nationhood continues to exist, albeit at changed levels and
through shifting audiences. Equally clearly, it continues to feed oﬀ the historical
legacy of division between intellectual opinion and that of wider publicists, to
whom an enhanced sense of English identity formed the basis of their sense of
citizenship. Current eﬀorts to resist the multicultural, devolutionist, and
the seed this west-country saint sowed.’ On English nationalism as ‘missionary’ or imperialist
nationalism, see Kumar, The making of English national identity, pp. 34–5.
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30 (2004), pp. 217–40.
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European tide have to be understood against this century-old backdrop of English
collective imagining which survived alongside the post-war British state. Just as it
was invoked in the Powell years against the perceived threat of mass immigration
and EEC membership, its recent assertion has much to do with concern for
alleged abuse of the immigration and asylum-seeking system, the widespread
denigration of English national culture, and the increasing loss of British national
sovereignty to Europe. If English national consciousness fails to develop into full-
blown political nationalism, the visceral patriotism that has been its moving force
hitherto remains a signiﬁcant obstacle to citizenship in many of its contemporary
forms : multicultural, European, cosmopolitan, and associationalist, to name but
a few.127 The ideal of citizenship risks becoming exclusive and ineﬀective if it
loses touch with nations and the patriotism which sustains them, as is now being
recognized in the United States.128
127 See R. Bellamy, ‘Citizenship beyond the nation-state : the case of Europe’, in N. O’Sullivan, ed.,
Political theory in transition (London, 2000).
128 See R. Brubaker, ‘ In the name of the nation: reﬂections on nationalism and patriotism’,
Citizenship Studies, 8 (2004), pp. 115–27.
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